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COMPARING MEDICAID FORECASTS 
Applied forecasting literature includes numerous 
studies in which different approaches are compared 
through simulated forecasting such as the M-competi-
tion, the M-2 Competition, and the M-3 Competition 
(Makridakis,  et. al., 1982; Makridakis  et. al., 1989; 
Hibon and Makridakis, 1997).  Less frequently, studies 
compare different actual forecasts of the same data series 
(Ashley, 1988); however, because of the small number 
of such multiple forecasts, there is limited opportunity to 
evaluate sources of variation. 
State government forecasting provides an oppor-
tunity for studying a large number of forecasts of similar 
series to determine the effects of different variables on 
forecasting practice.  Often, many states forecast similar 
series, such as tax revenue, nursing home bed need, 
prison population, or educational enrollment.  While 
some characteristics of these series differ from state to 
state other characteristics may be similar.  For example, 
the unit of analysis may be similar between states – each 
state might be interested in dollars of revenue, a count of 
children at each age cohort, and so forth.  Also, the se-
ries in each state may experience the similar social and 
political perturbances at about the same time.  The study 
of these such forecasts may provide insight about varia-
bles that affect applied forecasting. 
This paper examines forecasting activities among 
Medicaid agencies in the fifty United States, Washing-
ton, D.C., and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, 
Guam, Puerto Rico, Northern Mariana Islands, and Vir-
gin Islands). Most frequently, studies of state or local 
forecasting practice focus on revenue forecasting (Rodg-
ers and Joyce, 1996; Bretschneider and Schroeder, 1988; 
Bretschneider.  et. al.,  1989).  There are several reasons 
why comparison of state Medicaid forecast practice may 
be better than comparison of state revenue forecasting 
practices.  First, there is no consistent reporting of state 
revenue estimates.  States make forecasts when it suits 
them and report them in a manner that is satisfactory to 
their governors or legislatures.  Collection of data 
through national organizations such as the National As-
sociation of State Budget Officers is not so rigorous as to 
assure that reported data are comparable.  In contrast, 
Medicaid agencies must report their expenditure esti-
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mates to the federal government using the federally 
specified HCFA-37 form once a quarter beginning 
roughly 30 months before the end of each federal fiscal 
year.2 
Second, determining the accuracy of state revenue 
forecasts relies on the validity of state reported differ-
ences between planned and actual expenditure.  States 
may be politically motivated to report these data in a fa-
vorable manner.  By contrast, Medicaid forecasts, can be 
compared with accounting data as reported on a federal 
report known as the HCFA-64.  While these data may 
not be bias free,3 biases are likely to be small and simi-
lar from state to state. 
 
MEDICAID FORECASTING BACKGROUND 
Medicaid is a federal and state funded health care 
financing program.  The federal government contributes 
50% to 83% of the cost of the program in each state, 
with states contributing the balance. Medicaid is the 
largest human services program in state budgets, ac-
counting for 19.2% of total state spending in 1995.  It is 
second only to education in share of state general funds, 
and has the largest share of federal transfer payments to 
states (National Association of State Budget Officers, 
1996).  Medicaid is an entitlement program: once states 
establish rules about who is enrolled and what is cov-
ered they are barred from refusing to enroll eligible indi-
viduals or from refusing to pay for covered services due 
to funding shortfalls.  Medicaid pays for health care 
through vendor payments to health care suppliers (called 
“providers” by some states).  Beneficiaries present their 
Medicaid cards to enrolled suppliers who deliver ser-
vices and submit claims to state Medicaid agencies.  The 
state Medicaid agencies pay for these services based on 
“provider agreements,”  which set payment conditions.  
As a result, the Medicaid agency is usually the last to 
find out about the service. For these reasons, Medicaid 
budgeting is highly dependent on forecasting. 
Because the Medicaid program is funded with both 
state and federal funds, there are two levels of govern-
ment who use Medicaid forecasts for budgeting.  Prac-
tices at these levels of government can be somewhat dif-
ferent.  In a typical state government, a Medicaid admin-
istering agency makes a forecast that is submitted to an 
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although they appear in HCFA-64. Another disadvantage of comparing 
state forecasting practice using HCFA-37 data is that states may be 
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executive budget office for review.  Sometimes the exec-
utive budget office makes its own independent forecast 
which may be combined with, or substituted for, the 
Medicaid agency’s forecast (JLARC, 1997).  This fore-
cast is then submitted to the state legislature in the legis-
lative budget process.  The legislature may make another 
forecast or may choose to rely on the executive forecast.  
There can be various mixed practices, for example, a 
legislative agency may participate in selecting the execu-
tive forecast. 
The federal government uses the state forecasts in a 
different way.  The states submit their estimates to the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the fed-
eral agency responsible for administering the Medicaid 
grants to states, each quarter using a federal form, the 
HCFA-37 (formerly the HCFA-25).  Forecasts reported 
on this form are combined to produce national estimates.  
The federal government adjusts these estimates: (a) to 
account for new federal policy making that the states 
could not have known about when making their esti-
mates; and (b) to correct for perceived patterns of errors 
occurring in past forecasts (Trapnell, 1991).  The federal 
government uses these corrected forecasts to estimate 
federal Medicaid outlays for the next future federal 
budget year.  Estimates for years beyond those reported 
in the HCFA-37 are made by the HCFA Office of Actu-
ary using algorithms developed by a contractor prior to 
1980 (Trapnell, 1991).  In the federal budgeting prac-
tice, HCFA budget estimates originating either from the 
states or the Office of Actuary are subject to scrutiny by 
OMB and CBO. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Medicaid agen-
cies experienced several years of significant forecast er-
ror. In 1991 HCFA was criticized for unprecedented 
overages in the Medicaid budget (HHS NEWS, 1991;  
Executive Office of the President and Department of 
Health & Human Services, 1991).  At that time, the fed-
eral government concluded that state forecasting was a 
significant source of forecasting error (HHS NEWS, 
1991).  Medicaid and related health care forecasting and 
cost estimation have been the center of continued disa-
greement and concern throughout the 1990s (Rich, 
1991; Firshein, 1993; Doran, Roesenblatt, and Yama-
moto, 1994; Office of Technology Assessment, 1994; 
Holahan and Liska, December, 1996; Ratner, 1997; 
Scanlon, 1997; Holahan and Liska, 1997). 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MEDICAID PRATICE 
“Forecasting Techniques and Budgetary Issues of 
State Medicaid Programs” (McKusick, 1980) examines 
the forecasting practices of 10 state Medicaid programs.  
Data are gathered from site visits.  McKusick observes, 
“Although each state’s estimating techniques are 
unique, there are patterns that are common to most 
methodologies.”  These common patterns include: 
 States attempt to estimate demand for service, and 
pay little attention to supply of service. 
 Most state forecasts are prepared on a cash budget-
ing basis although some forecast accruals and con-
vert  to a cash basis. 
  In many circumstances, reimbursement rate in-
crease decisions are known prior to budgeting and 
can be used as an aid to expenditure forecasting. 
 Many states have poor quality data sources, but they 
compensate through inventive use of forecasting 
techniques. 
 Forecasting is understaffed in many states, leaving 
“many critical forecast issues . . . unanalyzed.” 
 Few states relate economic conditions to enroll-
ment.  Where they do, such analyses may be pri-
marily produced for other governmental functions. 
 State Medicaid budget estimates are “determined by 
the political process,” with frequent reliance on 
supplemental appropriations. 
 States forecast no more than a two years horizon. 
 States rely on trend analysis, rather than “looking 
for the underlying driving forces in medical costs.” 
 Some state forecasts submitted to the HCFA are 
consistent with their state budget estimates, while 
others are “the best guess of the analyst.” 
McKusick describes specific practices in each of 10 
states (California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia 
and Wisconsin).  Details are not summarized here. The 
matters he addresses include:  the participants in fore-
casting, the general forecasting approach (e.g., Califor-
nia divides the forecast into current services and policy 
modifications), number of periodic observations availa-
ble to the forecast model, level of data (annual, monthly, 
etc.), sources of data, forecasting techniques used, de-
gree of data decomposition, frequency of forecasting, the 
state budget calendar, ability to produce data reports for 
the federal government, relative size of the Medicaid 
program (to other Medicaid programs nationwide), 
breadth of Medicaid coverage, and components of Medi-
caid coverage.  Some of the techniques observed in-
clude: use of regression or systems of regression models, 
analysis of “historical trends,” use of a weighted average 
of inflation factor, use of judgment, use of graphing 
techniques,  use of nursing home bed supply infor-
mation, and use of negotiated rates (Texas). 
Because of the interaction with the political process, 
 
  
McKusick expects that states are motivated to underes-
timate expenditures; however, he observes, “[We] are 
puzzled that the aggregate of all state estimates should 
have proven accurate in the past since many have incen-
tives to estimate low and none appear to have incentives 
to estimate high.” 
McKusick does not attempt to establish a relation-
ship between these observations and relative forecasting 
accuracy. 
 
“Better Management for Better Medicaid Esti-
mates,” (Executive Office of the President, 1991) reports 
that from 1980 to 1990 the overall average error of state 
estimates is -0.3%; however, the federal government is 
concerned because of error and expected error for 1990 
through 1992 as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Year Error Comment 
1990 -9.2%  Actual 
1991 -18.0%  Expected 
1992 -16.0%  Expected 
 
HCFA determined that in 1990, 19 states had errors 
greater than 10% and 4 (Alabama, Kansas, Arizona and 
Massachusetts) had errors greater than 20%.  Error rates 
for the largest states grew from below 5% in 1990 to an 
unweighted average of 17% in 1991 as follows: Texas – 
27%, New York – 17%, and California – 7%, for a gross 
total of $2.1 billion. 
A HCFA/OMB task force visited nine large states 
that account for approximately 50% of all Medicaid ex-
penditure in 1991 and 1992 (Alabama, California, Flor-
ida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Texas).  They found: “Mis-estimates in 
these States appear to be due primarily to changes in 
Federal . . . policies . . . . Only about one-third of the 
mis-estimates were attributable to problems in the 
States’ estimating processes.  Economic trends appear to 
play a lesser role.”  Programmatic sources of cost in-
crease include health care inflation, court orders, and use 
of provider taxes and refundable donations.  Specific ob-
servations about state processes include: 
 Some States have well qualified personnel 
and employ sophisticated estimating mod-
els; others do not. 
 States that link Medicaid estimating to 
their State budget processes appear to pro-
duce more accurate estimates than those 
that do not. 
 Many States do not take reporting to the 
Federal Government . . . seriously, and 
thus do not provide accurate, complete or 
timely estimates. 
 Many States do not provide the Federal 
Government with the assumptions used in 
making estimates.  No distinction is made 
between baseline estimates and program 
estimates. 
 Technical problems include differences in 
fiscal years and State use of accrued versus 
cash budgeting. (Executive Office of the 
President, 1991) 
Some of these observations involve communication 
problems between the state and federal governments.  
Observations that appear to account for forecasting accu-
racy include (1) the assertion that forecaster qualification 
varies, and (2) the observation that states who link state 
and federal budgeting seem to provide the federal gov-
ernment better forecasts.  Evidence is not presented. 
 
Gordon R. Trapnell examined Medicaid forecasting 
in the early 1990s and produced two reports (Trapnell, 
1991; Trapnell, 1994).  The 1991 study reports empirical 
findings.  It serves two purposes, one is to explain par-
ticular forecast errors occurring in 1991 and 1992 (as 
anticipated in 1991).  The other is to provide some in-
sight into the federal use of state forecasts. While this 
discussion reveals some familiarity with particular prac-
tices of some states, it does not show comparison of ac-
tual practices and their forecasting casting consequences 
among the states.  Trapnell’s data collection method is 
not revealed, it appears that he relies primarily on infor-
mation already in the hands of HCFA.  His observations 
regarding state practices are as follows:4 
 Variation in forecasting accuracy may relate to 
composition of Medicaid beneficiary enrollment. 
 State legislators may choose to implement new po-
lices that are underestimated, that is, where political 
pressure for policies is high in relation to the deter-
mined costs. 
 States may defer spending at the end of a state fiscal 
year to ensure that state fiscal year estimates are 
correct.  This can happen because many states 
budget on a cash basis rather than an accrual basis. 
 Data available for forecasting in some states may be 
of poor quality or may not be reconciled with actual 
expenditure experience. 
 Past federal action may discourage states from re-
vealing their true estimates.  In particular, in 1982 
the federal government penalized states whose actu-
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al expenditures exceeded their forecasts.  As a con-
sequence, states may be motivated to overstate their 
estimates. 
 There is wide variety in the sophistication of state 
forecasting from “trended forward total aggregate 
spending by type of service” to “fully specified 
econometric model . . . . refitted quarterly.” 
 Only a few states fully disaggregate data by the type 
of service and type of beneficiary. 
 Locus of responsibility varies among the states, 
with Medicaid agencies preparing some forecasts, 
while budget officials preparing others. 
 There is “some correlation between how well offi-
cials understood the programs and the details incor-
porated in the cost estimates.” 
 State forecasts improve as the horizon between fore-
cast and the end of the fiscal year diminish.  
 States may not reconcile state and federal fiscal year 
reporting (most state fiscal years are from July to 




Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
Connecticut New Jersey D.C. Alabama Illinois 
Maine New York Delaware Florida Indiana 
Massachusetts Puerto Rico Maryland Georgia Michigan 
New Hampshire Virgin Islands Pennsylvania Kentucky Minnesota 
Rhode Island  Virginia Mississippi Ohio 
Vermont  West Virginia North Carolina Wisconsin 
   South Carolina  
   Tennessee  
     
Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 Region 9 Region 10 
Arkansas Iowa Colorado American Samoa Alaska 
Louisiana Kansas Montana Arizona Idaho 
New Mexico Missouri North Dakota California Oregon 
Oklahoma Nebraska South Dakota Guam Washington 
Texas  Utah Hawaii  
  Wyoming Northern Mariana  
   Nevada  
 
Trapnell’s analysis of state variation is limited to 
two paragraphs of his report in which he compares re-
gional aggregate variation between the HCFA-37 and 
HCFA-64 reports.  He finds that states in Region 1 
(states in each region are shown in Table 2) consistently 
underestimates its expenditures, states in Region 2 gen-
erally overestimate expenditures and states in Region 9 
are usually very accurate. Trapnell’s report makes no 
effort to account for these variations in accuracy.  How-
ever, the most obvious characteristic of regions Trapnell 
mentions as having consistent patterns of accuracy are 
that they are dominated by a single state.  New York ac-
counts for about 85% of federal expenditures in Region 
2 and California accounts for a similar amount in Re-
gion 9.  In Region 1, Massachusetts5 accounts for about 
                                                           
5 Massachusetts has two Medicaid agencies, the smaller of which is 
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60% of federal expenditures.  It is likely that the expla-
nation for the various forecasting results in these three 
regions will be found at these three states.  
 
Michele Insco of the Colorado state government 
conducted a Medicaid budget survey and circulated re-
sults to participating states in May, 1992 (Insco, 1992).  
This study consists of charts demonstrating factors that 
might affect forecast accuracy or expenditure values.  
Some variables charted include: state population, per-
cent change in Medicaid expenditure from FY 91 to FY 
92, characteristics of the Medicaid program including 
various policy factors of current interest in 1992, basis of 
accounting, and beginning/ending dates of state fiscal 
year.  Some of the characteristics reported include the 
percent of poverty at which pregnant women and certain 
children meet eligibility criteria, experience with Boren 
 
  
Amendment lawsuits,6  percentage of births in the state 
covered by Medicaid, coverage of certain optional popu-
lations, etc.  There is no accompanying written report to 
interpret these charts.  By implication, these variables 
are thought to bear a relationship to expenditures and 
forecast accuracy. 
 
The Human Services Finance Officers sponsored a 
survey of Medicaid budget estimation methods by Debo-
rah J. Lower (1993).  Lower reports that her survey is an 
extension of the Insco survey and is aimed at “determin-
ing what techniques were being used in other states to 
assist them in responding to legislative and executive 
branch questions.”  Lower surveyed the 50 US States 
and D.C., and reports a response rate of 84% (43 states). 
Lower’s study focuses on identifying practices rather 
than determining sources of variation. Lower does not 
attempt to evaluate the relationship between these prac-
tices and forecast success. Practices she finds are as fol-
lows. 
General: 
 States use their own forecasts as compared with 
contracting out forecasting functions. 
 Staff time required to complete the HCFA-37 
ranged from 0.1 to 15 FTE and averaged at 1.6 
FTE. (The phrasing of this question appears to limit 
the this response to completion of the form, and 
may exclude time required for forecasting.) 
 The HCFA-37 may be completed in differing cate-
gories than state budget forecasts. 
 Technical background of staff completing the 
HCFA-37 or related forecasts includes actuarial sci-
ence, accounting, budget, statistics, program/policy 
analysis, economics, management analysis and de-
mographics. 
 Budget office staff ranged from 1 to 44 employees 
and averaged at 7.8 FTE. 
 Primary responsibility for the Medicaid budget is 
with budget or finance agencies in 17 states and 
program or departmental administrators or staff 25 
states. 
 Twenty-six states report formal relationships be-
tween budget and finance staff and program staff. 
 Program staff have access to expenditure data in 35 
states. 
                                                           
6 The Boren Amendment is language in Title XIX of the Social Securi-
ty Act that allows states to pay institutional health care providers for 
efficient delivery of health care.  It is widely held that the amendment 
was originally passed to allow states to avoid paying excessive amounts 
to hospitals and nursing homes.  However, courts have interpreted it to 
prohibit states from paying hospitals and nursing homes too little.  The 
Boren Amendment was repealed in 1997. 
 Some states report that program staff do not have 
adequate technical skills for forecasting. 
 States report that Medicaid accounts for 4% to 52% 
of state budgets, averaging at 15.96%. 
 Forty states report the existence of written guberna-
torial guidance in budget preparation. 
Caseload Projections: 
 Thirty-seven states use data concerning eligibil-
ity (enrolled beneficiaries). 
 Thirty-one states evaluate population catego-
ries. 
 Twenty-seven states evaluate federal mandates 
for impact on enrollment. 
 Twenty-three states use “program specific in-
formation.” 
 Five states evaluate the impact of “retroactive 
eligibility.”7 
 Twenty-eight states report that they forecast 
based on cash data (expenditures on date of 
claims payment). 
 Eight states report that they forecast based on 
accrual (service date) data. 
 Four states report use of both cash and accrual 
data. 
 Six states report lack of access to “extract da-
ta.” 
 Lag time between service date and payment 
date is variable between states and between 
service categories. 
 The predominant periodicity of data is monthly. 
 The average length of a forecasted data series is 
5 years. 
 Utilization 
 Nineteen states report estimating utilization di-
rectly from enrolled beneficiaries. 
 Twelve states report using an intermediate de-
termination of service recipients. 
 Eleven states report use of both techniques. 
 Eighteen states use seasonal adjustments for 
some services. 
 Price Level 
 States uses price indexes such as CPI or local 
indexes. 
 States evaluate the impact of lawsuits. 
 Historical patterns may not be evaluated. 
 Thirty-seven states evaluate price level change 
by service type. 
 Twenty-one states evaluate price level change 
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by eligibility category. 
 Eight states evaluate price level change by oth-
er demographic categories. 
 Frequency of forecasts: 
 Sixteen states report updating forecasts quarter-
ly. 
 Ten states report updating forecasts “as need-
ed.” 
 Software Usage includes: 
 Spreadsheets (Lotus, Excel, Quattro Pro) 
 Statistical software (SAS, SPSS) 
 Forecast software (Forecast Pro) 
 Mainframe forecasting programs (five states) 
 Program features: 
 Fifteen states report no HMO enrollment. 
 Other states report enrollment from 553 to 
384,377 (Lower does not provide bases for per-
centage calculations). 
 Twenty-two states report involvement in Boren 
Amendment lawsuits. 
 Of thirty-two states reporting data, the percent-
age of births reimbursed through Medicaid 
ranged from 14% to 56% and averaged at 
36.4%. 
 Data sources used by states to estimate impacts of 
new policies include: 
 Program information (41 states) 
 Information from other states (40 states) 
 Census data (36 states) 
 Insurance company consultation (14 states) 
 Providers, actuaries, health or research data, 
and historical patterns. 
 Difficulties states report include: 
 Last minute program and policy changes. 
 Accuracy of population growth estimates 
 Accuracy of utilization estimates. 
 Budgetary constraints (state restrictions vs. 
federal mandates). 
 Data validity. 
 Technological advancements. 
 Variation in lag between service date and pay-
ment date. 
 Retroactive adjustments. 
 
It is difficult to compare these empirical studies be-
cause of the small number of agencies studied and dif-
ferences in specific matters observed.  Yet, some topics 
persist.  McKusick, Executive Office of the President 
(EOP), Insco, and Lower look into whether forecasts 
concern cash expenditures or intermediate accruals, and 
each finds variation in state practices.  McKusick, EOP, 
and Lower find variation in staff capacities.  McKusick 
and Trapnell find a relation between Medicaid forecast-
ing and the political environment.  McKusick, Trapnell, 
and Lower find variation in techniques used, degree of 
data disaggregation, data quality, and locus of forecast-
ing responsibility.  Also, they find that many states at-
tempt to account for policy making that affects Medicaid 
expenditures.  McKusick and EOP find that some states 
treat federal forecast reporting differently than state pur-
pose forecasting. 
On most commonly discussed matters, findings are 
consistent across the various studies.  It is not possible 
to determine change over time.  For example, McKu-
sick’s data are too vague and his sample too small for 
comparison with Lower. 
 
NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO MEDICAID 
FORECASTING 
Three HCFA guidelines for forecasting are exam-
ined: (1) Charts from a presentation on forecasting, (2) 
normative guidelines in “Better Management for Better 
Medicaid Estimates” (1991), and (3) HCFA-37 report-
ing expectations. 
HCFA (1990)8 recommends structuring the Medi-
caid forecast using of the formula: 
 
E(y+1) = (1 + P) x  (1 + U) x (1 + C) 
or 
E(y+1) = E(y) x (1 + P) x  (1 + U) x (1 + C) 
 
where, E(y+1) is the future year expenditure, P is the 
projected price, U is the projected utilization,9 C is the 
projected enrollment of beneficiaries,10 E(y) is the cur-
rent year expenditure, and  denotes year to year change 
calculated as ((Year 2)- (Year 1))/(Year 1).  These for-
mulae are sometimes called the PUC model (Price, Uti-
lization, and Caseload),11 Sometimes the first version is 
called the direct method and the second is called the in-
cremental method.  They provide a structure for calculat-
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9 With Medicaid, utilization can have several meanings.  HCFA offers 
two definitions: Service unit per enrolled beneficiary and claims fre-
quency.  HCFA recommends the earlier definition.  This utilization is a 
combination of two factors: ratio of beneficiaries using services (some-
times called “recipients”) to beneficiaries enrolled and ratio of service 
units to recipients.  Sometimes “utilization” is used to refer to one or 
the other of these component concepts. 
10 HCFA recommends that caseload be measured in average monthly 
enrolled beneficiaries per year. 
11 Sometimes, owing to a rearrangement of the variables, this model is 
called the CUP model. 
 
  
ing expenditures within each expenditure category.  Alt-
hough HCFA suggests that the direct method is more 
accurate, some of their material seems to recommend the 
use of the indirect method; perhaps because it is thought 
that the it is less difficult to find data supporting the in-
direct method. HCFA also recommends adjusting fore-
casts to reflect cash flow factors (lag between service 
date and payment date), decomposition of data into 
groups of homogeneous sub-populations, calculation of 
marginal-to-core ratios,12 and the use of demographic 
data to help identify marginal and core groups. 
Normative guidelines in “Better Management for 
Better Medicaid Estimates” (1991) are primarily di-
rected at HCFA.  State oriented recommendations in-
clude: requiring states to provide baseline (no policy 
change) estimates, listing of assumptions underlying 
these baseline estimates, and requiring separate estimate 
of expected changes.  It is not clear whether the framers 
of these guidelines intend that states will make better 
forecasts using these guidelines, or merely that HCFA 
will have a better change to discovering poor forecasts. 
The HCFA-37 does not explicitly require states to 
use any particular approach for forecasting.  Neverthe-
less, the form calls for the state to report on various fore-
cast elements in a manner that is consistent with the di-
rect method PUC model along with separate reporting of 
base line and expected changes.  To fulfill HCFA’s re-
porting requirements, the state must either structure its 
forecast to be consistent with the PUC model or it must 
compute PUC model variables from its actual forecast.  
Some states refer to this latter option as “backing into” 
the HCFA forecast.  Over time, the HCFA-37  has also 
added schedules to capture data on special issues of in-
terest to the federal government.  For example, at some 
times HCFA-37  reporting has included extensive re-
porting on the use of disproportionate share adjustments 
to hospitals.13  Sometimes these schedules involve re-
porting anticipated effects of recently passed federal leg-
islation.  The structure of these schedules may or may 
not reflect normative views concerning how HCFA 
                                                           
12 Marginal to core refers to an expectation that incremental element of 
enrollment will have a different utilization pattern than the base (core) 
enrollment.  This view can involve several unrelated matters.  First, 
newly enrolled beneficiaries may have a different usage pattern.  It may 
take awhile for them to establish relationships with medical care pro-
viders, so their usage may be lower.  On the other hand, they may be 
more urgent to obtain services that have been postponed while they had 
no health financing resources, so they may use more services.  Second, 
it is likely that there will be a lag between enrollment and payment for 
services.  As the federal government budgets on a cash basis, this lag 
appears as a reduced cost in the first year of service. 
13 Disproportionate share hospital adjustments have been a source of 
friction between states and the federal government since the early 
1990s. 
thinks states should estimate these policy changes. 
 
Trapnell (1991) discusses a variant of the PUC 
model that includes the marginal-to-core ratio. This 
model disaggregates Medicaid into 29 service catego-
ries, which are further decomposed into five compo-
nents:14 
 
E(y+1) = E(y) x (1 + P(y+1)) x  (1 + U(y+1)) x 
(1 + M x C(y+1)) 
 
where, E(y+1) is the future year expenditure, E(y) is the 
current year expenditure, P(y+1) is the projected change 
in price, U(y+1) is the projected change in utilization, 
C(y+1) is the projected change in enrollment of benefi-
ciaries, and M is the marginal-to-core factor. Some of 
these components may require separate calculation for 
each enrollment category.  Other components are essen-
tially static, or are estimated from sources outside of 
HCFA.  
Trapnell implies that use of this or a similar model 
would be the best method for states to forecast Medicaid 
expenditure.  However, elsewhere he says that the most 
important elements of good state forecasting are use of a 
skilled and attentive staff working within a comprehen-
sive analytic framework.  The PUC model serves as the 
analytic framework. 
Trapnell’s “Best Practices Guide for Preparation of 
Medicaid Budget Estimates,” (1994) presumably re-
flects his findings in his 1991 study.15 Most of Trap-
nell’s advice is general with no special application to 
Medicaid.  For example, he advises agencies to avoid 
expectations of accuracy that cannot be met and to be 
sure that outputs address client officials data needs.  He 
recommends evaluating forecasts through production of 
numerous outputs that can be compared with actuals, 
comparing forecasts with earlier forecasts of the same 
series, and making frequent forecast updates.  He rec-
ommends usual forms of pre-forecasting such as dis-
aggregating data and adjusting for non-recurring events, 
missing data, and lag time between accrual of liabilities 
and cash transactions.  He recommends optimizing the 
use of knowledge by such actions as establishing a rela-
tionship with program staff; distinguishing between 
matters that must be forecast and those that can be 
know; and distinguishing between the near future, about 
which forecasters may have special knowledge, and the 
distant future, about which they know considerably less. 
                                                           
14 Notation is slightly changed. 
15 The author has direct knowledge that Trapnell made site visits to 
other states beyond those discussed in the 1991 study. 
 
  
Trapnell raises considerable concern over data used 
in Medicaid forecasting.  This concern reflects a lack of 
faith in Medicaid data and health care data in general.  
Data concerns include completeness, reliability, validity 
and timeliness of data.  He suggests several methods of 
verifying data validity, by which he means that the data 
is what it purports to be.  Data can be validated by rec-
onciling with accounting records, by examining the pro-
cess of its production when produced by the Medicaid 
agency, and by examining the documentation of its pro-
duction and meaning when produced by others. 
Trapnell recommends the use of an analytic model 
to assure that the forecast addresses all elements of ex-
penditure.  The model he recommends is a another vari-
ant of the PUC model. 
Trapnell lists nine special features of Medicaid that 
make forecasting Medicaid expenditures harder than 
other health care expenditure forecasting these are: 
1. Criteria for Medicaid eligibility are very complex. 
2. Many beneficiaries are eligible and enrolled only for 
short periods. 
3. Some individuals become eligible for Medicaid in 
part because they have high medical bills, so they 
can be expected to continue to have high medical 
bills. 
4. Medicaid policy making leads to frequent changes 
in payment levels. 
5. Documentation of expenditures is incomplete. 
6. There are inconsistent definitions of data in ac-
counting and claims processing. 
7. There are constant changes in the program resulting 
from federal and state legislation, new regulations, 
administrative initiatives, and court decisions. 
8. The political process leads to a random patterns of 
interventions in payment rates and other program 
features. 
9. Medicaid agencies need to be able to explain their 
forecasts to officials and interest groups. 
Consequently, he recommends that the Medicaid 
forecast should: 
1. Be easy to understand and test for reasonableness. 
2. Be easy to adjust for changes. 
3. Be easy to incorporate ad hoc adjustments. 
4. Be easy and inexpensive to re-estimate using newer 
data. 
5. Be easy to change to accommodate program chang-
es. 
6. Produce numerous outputs to compare with actual 
experience. 
7. Produce outputs that fulfill forecast users’ needs. 
Trapnell also recommends that: 
 Medicaid forecasting methodology should be able to 
detect frequent unexpected shocks to the expendi-
ture system; 
 Forecasting should be insulated from political inter-
ference;  
 Staff should be assigned to forecasting as their full 
main work function, and 
 The loss function that forecasters should minimize 
is the consequences of forecast error.  Trapnell as-
sumes that there equally negative consequences for 
positive and negative errors, thus, he recommends a 
symmetrical loss function. 
Trapnell does not recommend any specific forecast-
ing technique.  He recommends against the use of com-
plex econometric models or “black box” techniques, ex-
cessive reliance on high technology, or reliance on any 
single technology.  Positive recommendations include 
use of simple techniques, fitting techniques to the data 
and the nature of the problem, and allocating resources 
for forecasting based on criteria of importance and diffi-
culty. 
 
The National Association of State Budget Officers 
(NASBO) issued a brief guideline on Medicaid estima-
tion practices (National Association of State Budget Of-
ficers, 1991).  NASBO offers the general model: 
“Simply put, a state’s expenditure on Medicaid is 
the product of the number of people using its ser-
vices (caseload) and the cost of providing those ser-
vices (price).  Several variables must be accurately 
forecast for the overall estimate to be correct: the 
economic environment in which the Medicaid pro-
gram operates, the eligible population, the types and 
prices of services used, the participation rate among 
eligible participants, policy initiatives, and the fed-
eral match rate. 
This guideline lists nine recommended practices: 
1. Include the budget agency, the Medicaid agency, 
and the legislative fiscal agency in the development 
of a Medicaid spending estimate.  This is labeled a 
“general practice” which serves consensus building. 
2. Ensure that the economics of the spending estimate 
are consistent with those of the revenue estimate.  
This practice is of greater concern at turning points 
when revenue and spending assumptions may be-
come disconnected. 
3. Ensure that the population assumptions used in the 
Medicaid estimate are consistent with overall state 
demographic trends.  Various state agencies should 
communicate to assure that estimates of related 
coverage groups are adequately coordinated. 
 
  
4. Maintain good data.  Recommended data elements 
include users, their attributes, and the services they 
use. 
5. Establish the price of services before the fiscal year 
begins.  The aim is to remove uncertainty.  “In gen-
eral, states will find it easier to develop accurate 
spending estimates if the cost of services is set be-
fore the fiscal year begins.  States that reimburse for 
actual costs incurred are at a disadvantage in this 
respect.” 
6. Account for caseload changes associated with out-
reach efforts.  This concern involves the interaction 
between various programs and the possibility that 
outreach for one program will affect another pro-
gram. 
7. Track federal and state legislation and regulations.  
This practice concerns the frequent changes in poli-
cies that affect Medicaid spending. 
8. Know the federal match rate16 and the likelihood of 
it changing.  This concern involves the distribution 
of costs between federal and state governments.  
Forecasting, in this sense, is oriented towards the 
costs to the state. 
9. Monitor the estimate.  Even good estimates can be 
wrong.  Medicaid agencies should produce monthly 
or quarterly reports that compares Medicaid spend-
ing with the original estimates.  Deviations should 
be explained, so that forecasting can improve over 
time. 
Recommendations 2 and 3 may improve accuracy if 
the facilitate communication between forecasters who 
have different perspectives on the state economy.  Rec-
ommendation number 4 is similar to one of Trapnell’s 
chief concerns, but Trapnell provides more explicit ad-
vice concerning its implementation.  Where states are 
able to comply with recommendation number 5, they 
eliminate the need to forecast what they can know.  Rec-
ommendation number 6 appears to be idiosyncratic to 
particular concerns of the early 1990s; however, it also 
seems to reflect Trapnell’s more general principle to 
maximize the use of knowledge.  HCFA, Trapnell and 
NASBO all show considerable concern over the impacts 
of policy making as discussed in recommendation 7.  
Recommendation number 8 involves monitoring, not 
                                                           
16 “Match rate,” is one of several terms used to refer to the proportion 
of Medicaid costs paid by the federal government.  Other terms are 
FMAP rate, FFP, federal share, match, etc.  This rate is published in 
the Federal Register in January or February each year with an effective 
data of the following October 1. Federal Funding Information for 
States (FFIS), an offshoot of the NASBO, monitors matching rates and 
forecasts changes prior to their official publication in the Federal Reg-
ister. 
forecasting.  It also reflects Trapnell’s principle to max-
imize use of knowledge.   
 
The Congressional Budget Office uses of a model 
similar to HCFA’s (Muse, 1993).  Muse’s concern is not 
to describe the forecasting of the ongoing program, but 
the method of estimating costs of program changes.  The 
particular changes he is concerned about involve preven-
tive child health.  He recommends the use of the follow-
ing model:17 
T=C x P x U + A - O 
 
where,  means “change in,” T is total payments, C is 
population, P is price, U is utilization, A is administra-
tive costs or savings, and O is offsets.  Muse’s notation 
is confusing.  If one assumes that C, P, and U are 
ratios18 as discussed by HCFA or Trapnell, then this 
formula needs the modification of including the base re-
imbursement in the right hand and the deletion of the 
change symbol on the left hand side of the formula; let 
B1 = the base expenditure level for medical care and B2 
= the base expenditure level for administration: 
T=B1 x (1+C) x (1+P) x (1+U) + B2 + A - O 
or 
T=B1 x C x P x U + A - (O + B1) 
If one assumes that C, P, and U are numbers in 
their original dimensions, rather than ratios, then a much 
more complex formula would be required: 
T = C x P x U + P x C x U + U x C x P +A - O 
 
where, C, P, and U are the population, price, and utiliza-
tion levels after the policy change and C, P, and U 
are the changes that led to these new levels.  Muse’s 
multiplication of changes by changes omits the effect of 
changes on the base program, which is likely to be the 
main effect of policy changes except in the rare circum-
stance that new beneficiaries getting new services and 
no old beneficiaries or old services are involved. 
Muse’s formulation adds two important considera-
tions, impact on administration and offsets.  These con-
cerns are more pertinent with program changes where 
administration may not already be provided for and off-
sets may have a direct budgetary effect.  Presumably, 
when forecasting the ongoing program, administration is 
already included in the budget and can be estimated di-
rectly.  This principle is reflected in the HCFA-37 form, 
which has a separate section for administrative expens-
es.  Offsets resulting from the base program are reflected 
                                                           
17 Notation is modified. 
18 A would still be a fully dimensional number. 
 
  
in the base and do not require separate estimation. 
Muse also provides considerable discussion of data 
quality.  This discussion focuses on three data sources, 
the Current Population Survey, the “Statistical Report of 
Medical Care: Eligibles, Recipients, Payments, and Ser-
vices,” (also known as the HCFA-2082 report), and the 
Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS).  Muse 
discusses the uses and weaknesses of these data sources.  
This discussion is not specifically normative; however, it 
exhibits the same sort of concern raised by Trapnell and 
NASBO, the forecaster/estimator must attend to data 
quality. 
Of special concern for estimators of new policy im-
pacts is an estimate of participation level for newly eli-
gible individuals.  For the base program, participation 
level is not a significant issue except where forces, such 
as outreach, might be changing this level.  For newly 
eligible individuals, the estimator needs to anticipate the 
degree to which this new population will seek to obtain 
services.  Muse says that this question is not easily re-
solved. 
Muse raises several objections to including esti-
mates of offsets in projecting new program costs. Two 
major reasons for this objection are (1) uncertainty – ev-
idence may be weak, elements of cost may be omitted 
from calculation of offsets, etc.; and (2) lack of impact – 
the beneficiary of the offset may be someone other than 
the entity who must make the cash outlay to obtain the 
offset.  In estimating and forecasting for budgets, one 
must remain aware of the cash outlay consequences of 
forecasted events. 
Muse also observes that estimators should engage 
in reality checking; that is, comparing calculated results 
with the views that people might expect in the real 
world. 
 
The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commis-
sion of the Virginia General Assembly (JLARC) has re-
viewed Virginia's Medicaid forecasting in 1992 and 
1997.19  In reports of these studies, JLARC recommends 
six criteria for forecast models and five criteria for a 
forecasting process (1991; 1997).  These criteria are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3: Criteria for Forecast Models 
1. Model assumptions are clearly understood by partici-
pant and periodically reviewed. 
                                                           
19 (1) The author was the budget director at the agency that administers 
Medicaid in Virginia in 1991.  (2) Other states have conducted similar 
studies; however, there is no systematic method for finding such re-
ports. 
2. Variables used in models’ equations are sufficient, 
accurately measured, and the best information available 
at the time. 
3. Equations are mathematically sound and tested to en-
sure mathematical precision. 
4. Different regional conditions are taken into account 
sufficiently. 
5. Forecast errors are analyzed on an ongoing basis. 
6. Forecast models are reviewed and documented well, 
including any judgmental or policy adjustments 
 
Table 4:  Criteria for Evaluating Forecasting Process 
1. The degree of uncertainty associated with forecasts 
should be understood by process participants. 
2. The agency making forecasts should have the data 
and personnel required to generate a good estimate. 
3. Regular reports on actual expenditures and their vari-
ance from forecasts should be developed and available to 
agency staff and interested external participants, as ap-
propriate. 
4. The process should maintain the flexibility to respond 
to dramatic changes in recipient utilization and program 
expenditures by revising the forecasts. 
5. The process should include a mechanism requiring 
some level of expanded review of the forecasts.  (Ex-
panded review means review by people not involved in 
initial forecasting, such as an external panel. 
 
Except for criterion 4 of the forecasting process, 
these are not especially focused on Medicaid. They 
might be applied to any forecasting problem.  Most of 
these appear to be a subset of more extensive criteria 
used in evaluating revenue forecasting (Joint Legislative 
Audit and Review Commission, 1991). 
 
Many of these normative guidelines support the 
goal of forecasting accuracy.  For example, JLARC rec-
ommends that formulae be valid and NASBO, among 
many others, recommends the use of good data.  Yet, 
many other recommendations concern other matters.  
Trapnell recommends against unrealistic expectations of 
forecast results and JLARC similarly recommends that 
forecast participants should understand the degree of 
uncertainty associated with the forecasts. 
 
RELATION TO REVENUE FORECASTING 
Revenue forecasting literature suggests a tendency 
for an asymmetrical forecasting loss function, favoring a 
cushion between total revenue and total expenditures 
(Rodgers and Joyce, 1996).  The rationale is that the 
penalty for overestimated revenue is greater than the 
 
  
penalty for underestimated revenue. Similar reasoning 
would have states overestimate expenditures in major 
expenditure categories such as Medicaid.  Surpluses are 
less damaging and, in many states, can be repro-
grammed at the end of the fiscal year to offset deficits 
elsewhere. 
However, cushioning budgets through overestima-
tion of Medicaid expenditures differs from underestima-
tion of revenue in one important respect.  It changes the 
locus of control over the cushion. Unappropriated reve-
nue – which is the status of unexpected revenue result-
ing from greater receipts than budgeted – is, generally, 
controlled by the central administrative agencies or the 
legislature. Over-appropriated funds, resultant from ap-
propriating funds to Medicaid agencies based on overes-
timated forecasts, are controlled by line agencies.  As 
there is a natural distrust between central administrative 
agencies and line agencies, it is unlikely that states 
would intentionally allow line agencies to control sur-
plus funds. 
Nevertheless, the line agencies, who submit the 
HCFA-37, may be motivated to seek surplus funding as 
a cushion against their own forecast error. There would 
be no advantage for these line agencies to make separate 
lower estimates for HCFA. 
Trapnell argues that agencies might find differing 
but equally negative consequences for overestimating 
and underestimating expenditures. McKusick proposes 
that there is lower penalty for underestimation. On the 
other hand, Muse’s rationale for not counting offsets in 
estimating program changes suggests a higher penalty 
for underestimation. 
The conflict concerning presence and direction of 
bias can be explained by several factors.  First, McKu-
sick’s study reported in 1980 reflects a relatively small 
Medicaid program.  With this small program, political 
decision making may be more important than financial 
risk, as is also suggested in some of Trapnell’s discus-
sion.  In their effort to maximize their distribution of 
benefits, elective officials may consider a small risk of 
over expenditure to be less important than their ability to 
distribute benefits to more people.  Still, neither 
McKusick or Trapnell found empirical evidence of actu-
al underestimation.   
 
SOME HYPOTHESES 
These studies provide little explanation of relative 
forecasting accuracy.  However, they are a source for 
many hypotheses about Medicaid forecasting. In general 
these hypotheses are found by extrapolating the objective 
of normative guidelines or the reasons for inquiry in em-
pirical studies.  To a large degree, where there is explan-
atory discussion, most of the views agree with each oth-
er.  In a few cases, as with the matter of asymmetrical 
loss function, there is disagreement.  Where there is dis-
agreement, the cited sources may not all support the 
form of the hypothesis expressed here.  Following are 
hypotheses that can be extracted from this body of litera-
ture: 
 
1. States’ loss functions will be asymmetrical with a 
preference for overestimation (Trapnell, McKusick, 
Muse).  McKusick proposes a preference for under-
estimation.  Trapnell offers conflicting views, (1) he 
argues that the political environment equally pun-
ishes over- and underestimation, (2) he points out 
that past federal behavior may create a bias for 
overestimation, and (3) he proposes that underesti-
mation bias arises from frequent selection of policy 
initiatives that are underestimated. 
2. States manipulate fiscal year end results to improve 
forecasting results within state budgeting.  By im-
plication states whose fiscal year ends coincide with 
federal fiscal year ends will appear to be more accu-
rate (EOP, Trapnell, Insco). 
3. Forecast models result in more accurate forecasts 
when they: 
a) Account for delivery of medical care on service 
date with lagged transformation to cash pay-
ment date (McKusick, Insco, Lower, Trapnell, 
Muse). 
b) Decompose data into homogenous service and 
enrollment categories (McKusick, Trapnell, 
Lower). 
c) Reflect the PUC model or an extended version 
of the PUC model (HCFA, Trapnell, Muse, 
NASBO). 
d) Relate enrollment to economic conditions (Mc-
Kusick). 
e) Relate service utilization with service supply 
(McKusick). 
f) Decompose series into baseline and policy 
events (McKusick, Trapnell, Lower, EOP, 
HCFA, NASBO, Muse, JLARC). 
g) Decompose utilization into recipients per bene-
ficiary and units of service per recipient (Low-
er). 
h) Relate price estimates to price indexes (Lower, 
Trapnell). 
i) Account for federal matching rates (NASBO). 
j) Account for regional variation (JLARC). 




i) Skill (EOP, Lower, JLARC). 
ii) Quantity (McKusick, Lower, JLARC). 
iii) Dedication to the forecasting function, as 
opposed to part-time forecasting (Trap-
nell). 
b) Forecaster understanding of: 
i) Forecast model assumptions (JLARC). 
ii) The Medicaid program (Trapnell). 
c) Forecaster access to program staff (Trapnell). 
d) Data: 
i) Quality (McKusick, Trapnell, Lower, 
NASBO, Muse, JLARC). 
ii) Sources (Lower, Trapnell, Muse). 
iii) Periodicity (monthly, etc.) (McKusick, 
Lower). 
iv) Series length (Lower). 
e) Setting rates prior to forecasting (McKusick, 
Trapnell, NASBO). 
f) Composition of the Medicaid program (McKu-
sick, Trapnell, Insco, Lower). 
g) Update frequency (Trapnell, Lower). 
h) Length of forecast horizon (Trapnell). 
i) Decomposition of forecast into near future and 
distant future (Trapnell). 
j) Whether seasonality is examined (Lower). 
k) Use of software: 
i) Spreadsheets (Lower). 
ii) Statistical software (Lower). 
iii) Forecast software (Lower). 
l) Use of pre-forecast data editing (Trapnell). 
m) Insulation of forecasting from politics (Trap-
nell). 
n) Allocation of forecasting resources to problems 
(components) according to difficulty and im-
portance (Trapnell). 
o) Use and quality of forecast evaluation (Trap-
nell, NASBO, JLARC). 
5. Intra-governmental forecasting factors that affect 
forecasting accuracy include: 
a) Locus of primary forecasting responsibility –
Medicaid agency or other state agency (McKu-
sick, Lower). 
b) Cooperation between forecasting bodies (Low-
er, NASBO, JLARC). 
c) Whether there is coordination between Medi-
caid forecasting and other state forecasting 
(NASBO). 
d) Use of “expanded review” (JLARC). 
6. Accuracy is improved when forecasting techniques 
are: 
a) Simple (Trapnell).  
b) Not “black box” (Trapnell). 
c) Fit to the nature of the problem (Trapnell). 
d) Fit to the quality of the data (Trapnell). 
e) Easy to use (Trapnell). 
f) Capable of detecting the effects of policy 
shocks (Trapnell). 
7. Forecasting accuracy is not associated with the use 
of any particular forecasting techniques (Trapnell). 
However, McKusick suggests the opposite, imply-
ing that more sophisticated techniques may result in 
greater accuracy. 
8. When multi-stage forecasts are used, accuracy of 
later stage forecasts depend on the accuracy of earli-
er stage forecasts (Trapnell). 
9. Large policy events affect forecasting accuracy.  In 
particular, forecasting accuracy is affected by: 
a) Boren Amendment Lawsuits (Insco, Lower). 
b) Federal policies concerning pregnant women 
and children (Insco, Lower). 
c) State initiatives involving Disproportionate 
Share Hospitals (Trapnell, EOP). 
10. Perceived forecasting importance affects accuracy 
and bias.  In particular: 
a) The relative size of the Medicaid program to 
other state programs affects accuracy.  As the 
program increases in relative size, accuracy be-
comes more valued (McKusick, Lower).  
McKusick does not offer this view, instead it is 
implied in his observation of low concern for 
accuracy in 1980, when Medicaid programs 
were comparatively small components of state 
budgets. 
b) The centrality of forecast preparation to state 
budgeting (McKusick, EOP).  EOP observed 
that states who prepare their federal budget 
forecast in connection with their state budget 
forecast appear to submit more accurate federal 
forecasts.  However, it is the current author’s 
observation that this relationship may be com-
plex.  If state budget forecasting is biased for 
political reasons, independent forecasts may be 
more accurate. 
c) The relative share of expenditures paid by state 
funds, as compared with federal funds, affects 
forecast accuracy (NASBO).  Where states pay 
a higher share – that is, have a lower match 






 States Federal 
Year UnwAvg CumAvg UnwAvg CumAvg 
1982 -4.7% -4.7% 21.6% 21.6% 
1983 -5.3% -5.0% 12.8% 17.2% 
1984 -4.9% -5.0% 54.7% 29.7% 
1985 -3.6% -4.6% 53.7% 35.7% 
1986 -0.3% -3.7% -0.4% 28.5% 
1987 8.1% -1.8% -0.2% 23.7% 
1988 8.9% -0.2% 9.5% 21.7% 
1989 6.6% 0.6% 13.1% 20.6% 
1990 8.4% 1.5% -2.8% 18.0% 
1991 23.8% 3.7% 43.9% 20.6% 
1992 35.5% 6.6% 43.2% 22.6% 
1993 6.8% 6.6% 46.0% 24.6% 
1994 -6.2% 5.6% 78.1% 28.7% 
1995 -1.5% 5.1% 7.9% 27.2% 
UnwAvg. = Unweighted average.  
CumAvg. = Cumulative average.  
Percent error 24 months prior to fiscal year end. 
 
EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES 
These hypotheses are too numerous to fully evaluate 
in this paper.  Further, for many operationalization may 
be problematic.  The following discussion discusses evi-
dence concerning some of these hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  States will exhibit an asymmetrical 
loss function with a preference for overestimation. 
Analysis of this hypothesis is based on data from 
the HCFA-37/HCFA-25 budget requests and the HCFA-
64 accounting records for the years 1982 through 1995.  
Over this period, the longest horizon consistently availa-
ble is 24 months before the end (12 months before the 
beginning) of the fiscal year.  Data are divided into two 
groups, one for the 50 states,20 and another for the 6 fed-
eral districts and territories.  Errors are analyzed using 
the percent error [(Actual minus Forecast) divided by 
Actual].  As the forecast is subtracted from the actual, a 
negative error means the forecast exceeded actual ex-
penditures. 
As shown in Table 5, states have negative valued 
errors in 7 of 14 years, and positive valued errors in the 
remaining 7.  Cumulatively, the error is negative for the 
first 7 reported years, and positive for the remaining 7 
years.  Table 6 shows that more than 50% of states have 
negative errors in 6 years, while they have positive errors 
in the 8; however, cumulative errors are negative in 8 of 
14 years.  
                                                           




 States Federal 
Year % <=0 Cum. % % <=0 Cum. % 
1982 71.4% 71.4% 40.0% 40.0% 
1983 79.6% 75.5% 0.0% 20.0% 
1984 74.0% 75.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
1985 78.0% 75.8% 16.7% 19.0% 
1986 46.0% 69.8% 83.3% 33.3% 
1987 20.0% 61.4% 66.7% 39.4% 
1988 22.0% 55.7% 16.7% 35.9% 
1989 22.0% 51.5% 33.3% 35.6% 
1990 22.0% 48.2% 66.7% 39.2% 
1991 8.0% 44.2% 33.3% 38.6% 
1992 4.0% 40.5% 16.7% 36.5% 
1993 38.0% 40.3% 50.0% 37.7% 
1994 80.0% 43.4% 0.0% 34.7% 
1995 62.0% 44.7% 0.0% 32.1% 
 
These results appear to imply that state forecasting 
of Medicaid expenditures is unbiased.  However, this 
understanding may be incorrect.  Medicaid has experi-
enced differing phases of policy activity.  During the ear-
ly 1980s, policy making activity was relatively low.  
However, in the mid-1980s the federal government be-
gan to engage in extensive Medicaid policy making, in-
cluding several expansions of eligibility for children and 
pregnant women, welfare reform that expanded Medi-
caid eligibility, Medicare reform that extended Medicaid 
eligibility to low income Medicare beneficiaries, and 
broadening of the minimum coverage requirements for 
children.  In part, the states responded to these changes 
by incorporating even more services under Medicaid – 
off loading the cost of those services from programs 
funded solely with state funds – and by using provider 
tax and/or donation programs that have the effect of in-
creasing the effective federal share of total program 
costs.  Most such policy making resulted in huge ex-
penditure increases over very short horizons.  It is un-
likely that these policies would be reflected in forecasts 
discussed here. 
Table 7 and Table 8 show comparative data at 12 
months before the end of the fiscal year (the last forecast 
before any portion of the actual expenditures are experi-
enced),  The number of years with positive and negative 
errors is similar to those in Table 5 and Table 6  – 7 
negative average errors  and 7 positive (Table 7); and 8 
years with more than 50% of states with negative errors 
and 6 with fewer than 50% (Table 8).  However, the 
cumulative columns reveal a bias towards negative er-
 
  
rors.  Table 7 shows only 5 years in which the cumula-
tive errors are positive, as compared with 9 years of neg-
ative cumulative errors.  Table 8 shows only 1 year 
where the cumulative percent of states with negative er-
rors is below 50%.  Over this 14 year period the cumula-
tive percent of states with negative forecasting errors is 
53.3%.21 
These results are consistent with the broader view 
that budget officials are risk averse.  Overestimation of 
expenditures serves the same ends as underestimation of 
revenue, to establish a cushion against higher risk error.  
While errors that lead to surpluses may be viewed unfa-
vorably by those who could have allocated funds to other 
purposes.  The alternative of shortfalls can lead to finan-
cial crisis.  This analysis supports the view that Medi-
caid forecasters are more averse to financial crisis.  
It is interesting that these results are not found with 
the federal districts and territories. These data demon-
strate a bias for underestimation.  The unweighted aver-
age forecast error for these six districts at the beginning 
of fiscal years is positive for 10 of 14 years with the cu-
mulative average error positive 13 of 14 years (Table 7).  
While there are an equal number of years in which the 
majority of these districts make negative and positive 
forecasts at this horizon, cumulatively over 14 years, 
47.6% of federal district forecasts overestimate expendi-
tures (Table 8).  Federal districts do not have the same 
bias towards overestimation as states, and they may be 
biased towards underestimation.  No explanation of this 
alternative bias is available at this time. 
 
Table 7 
 States Federal 
Year UnwAvg CumAvg UnwAvg CumAvg 
1982 -5.0% -5.0% -6.3% -6.3% 
1983 -2.1% -3.5% 13.0% 3.4% 
1984 -5.0% -4.0% 33.3% 13.3% 
1985 -2.0% -3.5% 1.3% 10.3% 
1986 0.2% -2.8% -4.0% 7.5% 
1987 5.1% -1.5% 0.6% 6.3% 
1988 2.4% -0.9% 8.8% 6.7% 
1989 0.8% -0.7% -4.9% 5.2% 
1990 2.9% -0.3% -3.5% 4.3% 
1991 11.5% 0.9% 41.0% 7.9% 
1992 4.8% 1.2% 38.5% 10.7% 
1993 -4.1% 0.8% 43.8% 13.5% 
1994 -4.3% 0.4% 24.8% 14.3% 
1995 -0.1% 0.4% 1.3% 13.4% 
                                                           
21 This result may be affected by beginning arbitrarily in 1982, the first 
year of data availability. 
UnwAvg. = Unweighted average.  
CumAvg. = Cumulative average.  
Percent error 12 months prior to fiscal year end. 
 
Table 8 
 States Federal 
Year % <=0 Cum. % % <=0 Cum. % 
1982 75.5% 75.5% 80.0% 80.0% 
1983 73.5% 74.5% 20.0% 50.0% 
1984 88.0% 79.1% 16.7% 37.5% 
1985 58.0% 73.7% 33.3% 36.4% 
1986 52.0% 69.4% 83.3% 46.4% 
1987 30.0% 62.8% 66.7% 50.0% 
1988 36.0% 58.9% 33.3% 47.5% 
1989 42.0% 56.8% 66.7% 50.0% 
1990 34.0% 54.2% 66.7% 51.9% 
1991 22.0% 51.0% 33.3% 50.0% 
1992 28.0% 48.9% 16.7% 46.9% 
1993 84.0% 51.8% 50.0% 47.1% 
1994 70.0% 53.2% 16.7% 44.7% 
1995 54.0% 53.3% 83.3% 47.6% 
 
Hypothesis 2: States manipulate fiscal year end ac-
counting data to improve forecast outcomes. 
State motivation for this practice rests with the fact 
that, in the case of Medicaid, the forecast coincides with 
the budget.  State officials may be motivated to ensure 
that the actual expenditures coincide with planned ex-
penditures.  In the case of Medicaid, ordinary fiscal 
management may not be sufficient to attain such results.  
Most Medicaid expenditures are made through claims 
processing, not discretionary or quasi-discretionary ex-
penditures.  In most states, claims processing is auto-
mated.  So, adjusting year end expenditures to match 
budget plans would involve causing claims processing 
to accelerate or decelerate. 
Medicaid programs are operated by state agencies.  
Executives of these agencies are responsive to state offi-
cials, including state governors and state legislators, be-
cause they report to these officials.  So, the motivation to 
appear correct would be a feature of state budgeting.  
There is no particular advantage of manipulating ex-
penditures reported to the federal government to achieve 
the illusion of forecast accuracy.  Presumably, the illu-
sion is achieved by either delaying or accelerating pay-
ments in the last quarter of the fiscal year, with a mirror 
image change in expenditures in the next fiscal quarter.  
So, the illusion should appear in data from those states 
whose fiscal year coincides with the federal fiscal year, 








States:    
April 6.55% 1 14 
July 6.54% 46 643 
Combined 6.54% 47 657 
September 4.45% 1 14 
October 5.46% 2 28 
Combined 5.12% 3 42 
    
Federal Districts 20.9% 6 84 
 
To evaluate this hypothesis absolute percent error 
for each state are pooled across the 14 years and then 
averaged within groups for each fiscal year end.  Federal 
districts are reported separately.  The absolute error is 
evaluated because the direction of error is not at issue.  
The errors are pooled because of the low number of 
states whose fiscal year coincides with the federal fiscal 
year.  There are 46 states with fiscal years beginning in 
July, 1 beginning in April (New York), 1 beginning in 
September (Texas), and two beginning in October 
(Michigan and Alabama).  The federal fiscal year begins 
in October.  The pooled observations are not independ-
ent, so no statistical analysis is attempted. 
For the 47 states with fiscal years beginning more 
than a month off of the beginning of the federal fiscal 
year, the average absolute error for 647 separate fiscal 
years (Arizona is not reported for 1982) is 6.54%.  If 
Texas (fiscal year beginning in September) is included 
with this group, the average drops to 6.50%.  For the 
two states with fiscal years matching the federal fiscal 
year, the average absolute error for 28 separate fiscal 
years is 5.46%.  If Texas is included with this group, the 
average drops to 5.12%.  Thus, the range of difference 
between these errors is between 1.04% and 1.42% de-
pending on which group Texas is included with.  These 
results weakly support the view that states manipulate 
year end activities to create the illusion of budgetary ac-
curacy. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Forecasts are more accurate when 
forecast models more explicitly reflect the elements 
generating the forecasted series. 
Data are not available to evaluate each of the 10 
sub-hypotheses enumerated.  However, two sub-
hypotheses can be evaluated.  The first sub-hypothesis 
specifies that forecasts will be more accurate when 
states explicitly account for the transformation between 
service date and payment date.  This sub-hypothesis is 
evaluated using the pooled 14 year absolute forecast er-
rors as discussed with the second hypothesis.  Identifica-
tion of states who explicitly account for service date to 
payment date transformation is found in data determined 
by Lower.  Results are shown in Table 10. States who 
focus on “payment date” do not attempt to evaluate ser-
vice date (accrual) events, while those who forecast 
“service date” do.  (No federal districts are reported in 
the Lower study.)  A third group of states evaluate ser-
vice date data some times.  Based on these pooled errors, 
there is no reason to anticipate that accounting for the 





Payment Date 6.10% 28 
Service Date 6.13% 9 
Mixed 7.61% 6 
 
However, it may be that the time period between the 
earlier forecasts and the date of the Lower survey invali-
dates the evaluation using these pooled errors.  Table 11 
shows comparable results with errors pooled from 1992 
through 1995.  As with Table 10, there is no evidence 
that forecast models that account for service date events 






Payment Date 5.75% 28 
Service Date 6.10% 9 
Mixed 6.23% 6 
 
The third sub-hypothesis specifies that forecasts 
made within the framework of the recommended PUC 
model will be more accurate than those that are not.  
This hypothesis is of special concern as HCFA requires 
states to produce and submit data on the HCFA-37 that 
reflects the PUC model, whether or not they use this 
model.  If the hypothesis is incorrect, states may be re-
quired to conduct unnecessary analyses and forecasts for 
the sole purpose of completing arduous paperwork re-
quired by HCFA. 
The evaluation of this hypothesis is based on the 
same 4 year pooled errors as used in Table 11.  Identifi-
cation of states that use the PUC model is based on pre-
 
  
liminary data from a survey of state Medicaid agencies 
occurring in 1997.  At the time of this paper, the survey 
has received 35 responses out of 56 Medicaid programs.  
Results are shown in Table 12.  Based on these results, 
there is no evidence that use of the PUC model improves 








Use PUC 5.65% 13 
Do not Use PUC 5.81% 20 
Federal 8.97% 2 
 
Hypothesis 4: Forecast accuracy is affected by nu-
merous specific technical elements of the forecast.   
Most aspects discussed here are still to be evaluat-
ed.  Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between 
forecast accuracy and time.  Each line demonstrates the 
change in forecast error over the period beginning with 
the first forecast submitted to HCFA and ending with 
the fiscal year end.  Data do not always converge to zero 
because the HCFA-37 was not required to match the 
HCFA-64 (accounting data) for past periods prior to 
1992.  It is not very surprising that forecasts become 
more accurate as the forecast horizon diminishes.  It is 
interesting how little accuracy improves over time in 
many years.  The chart shows only minimal improve-
ment in average error in forecasts for 1982 through 
1986, 1994, and 1995.  These results arise because of 
relative accurate forecasts at the longest horizons.  A re-
view of state specific data (not shown here) reveals that 
accuracy in earlier periods arises from the cancellation of 
forecast errors between states, and that there is a conver-
gence towards forecast accuracy over time. 
 



































This paper is a interim report of research in pro-
gress.  The report shows that Medicaid forecast data can 
be used to evaluate applied forecasting.  Some tentative 
conclusions include: 
State forecasters use asymmetrical loss functions in 
selecting forecasts to report.  Forecasters are more averse 
to underestimation of expenditures than to overestima-
tion. 
Federal district and territory forecasters are not 
averse to underestimation and may be averse to overes-
timation. 
States may manipulate fiscal year end activities to 
ensure the accuracy of fiscal plans. 
There is no evidence the explicitly accounting for 
some details of data generating events – specifically, the 
transformation between service date events and payment 
 
  
date events – results in increased forecasting accuracy. 
There is no evidence that the HCFA recommended 
Price x Utilization x Caseload model of data generation 
produces more accurate forecasts. 
Forecast accuracy is associated with length of hori-
zon. 
These results support the view that further analysis 
of these data will generate other interesting findings that 
can improve the understanding of applied forecasting. 
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